I’m the Never Ending Pie Throwing Robot, aka NEPTR.

Linux enthusiast, programmer, and privacy advocate. I’m nearly done with an IT Security degree.

TL;DR I am a nerd.

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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: November 20th, 2024

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  • You don’t need to say the words “sandboxed” or “isolated” to say effectively the same thing. Your goal with distrobox was to keep the AUR malware separate from your normal system, no?

    Security through obscurity is not security. The malware can do the same data exfiltration regardless of root access because the AUR malware has been about stealing secrets in user-readable directories. Setting a custom home for distrobox does not disallow access to the normal one.

    Say for example that your default user home is /home/user and you set the distrobox home to /tmp/home

    If you run ls $HOME inside distrobox it will list files in /tmp/home, but just as easily you could run ls /home/$USER and it would list in your default home. Or alternatively just use the find command and steal secrets without targeting the user home.

    This is because changing the user home through distrobox doesn’t do anything about preventing directory traversal to your default home.

    If your goal is to create a different environment and you don’t care that it won’t stop malware, use Incus or Podman directly. Distrobox is the wrong choice.

    My point was simple: when dealing with malware, distrobox is not an effective method of creating a “different environment” because that is antithetical to its stated goals.

    You can do whatever you want, I am not here to police your choice on your personal system. I only take issue with recommending this strategy to others.


  • Distrobox is not an isolated environment, it is quite the opposite. They say so themselves on their page:

    Security implications

    Isolation and sandboxing are not the main aims of the project, on the contrary it aims to tightly integrate the container with the host. The container will have complete access to your home, pen drive, and so on, so do not expect it to be highly sandboxed like a plain docker/podman container or a Flatpak.

    I would argue that Docker isn’t a good way to stop malware either, since it is highly vulnerable to sandbox escape leveraging the shared host-guest kernel, like the many of LPEs that have been found in the last few months (example using copy-fail).

    Docker is not a secure sandbox, Podman is not a secure sandbox, Flatpak is not a secure sandbox. Use a VM, or better yet, don’t use the AUR.